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Abstract  
Since the early years of independence in 1991, a central topic of higher education in Uzbekistan 
has been how to fill the gap left by the reduced government funding at public higher education 
institutions (HEIs). The majority of the Uzbek universities, as in many other countries, have 
responded to the decline in public allocations through charging significantly increased tuition 
fees. Therefore, the revenue structure of public HEIs has changed from full government funding 
to mostly tuition funding over the last decade. Utilising resource dependence theory (RDT), this 
study empirically investigates whether or not increased institutional reliance on tuition fees as a 
main source of revenue has augmented the share of institutional expenditures dedicated to 
educational activities at public HEIs in Uzbekistan over the period 2000-2013. Drawing on a 14-
year panel of university-level data and employing an instrumental variable approach that 
acknowledges the potential endogeneity of institutional tuition revenue, the analysis suggests   
that institutional expenditures for educational expenses are considerably increased as institutions 
became more dependent on tuition revenue for their financially sustainable operation. This 
finding is consistent with the predictions of RDT. Robustness of the empirical findings is also 
checked utilising several diagnostic models, and the results revealed that the IVs applied during 
the TSLS estimations are valid and they simultaneously uncorrelated with the error term. 
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Research Dependence Analysis of Public Higher Education Institutions in 
Uzbekistan 
 
1. Introduction 
In the aftermath of the recent financial crisis, many countries had to considerably reduce 
their spending on public service sectors, such as health, transportation, education and tourism, in 
order to balance their budgets (Johnstone and Marcucci, 2010). Education was often among the 
sectors that lost out as a result of such public cuts (Albrecht and Ziderman, 1995; Sanyal and 
Johnstone, 2011). Higher education institutions have been struggling to find sufficient financial 
resources for conducting basic teaching and research activities due to the decline in government 
allocations (Barr, 2009; Sam, 2011). In some countries, the process of reforming the HEIs, to 
make them less dependent on government funding, had already been ongoing by giving more 
financial autonomy to their public HEIs for obtaining funds from external/private sources 
(Johnstone, 2004; Salmi and Hauptman, 2006; Sanyal and Johnstone, 2011). Many public HEIs 
used this newly ‘granted’ financial autonomy to introduce or dramatically increase tuition and 
other user charges (Barr, 2010; Muscio et al., 2013). Most of the previous studies on 
consequences of increased tuition and other user charges have largely focused on their impact on 
behaviours of students (Canning at. al, 2007; Johnstone and Marcucci, 2010; Paulsen and Smart, 
2001; Psacharpoulos and Partinos, 2004; Sam, 2011; Tilak, 2004). Over the recent years, 
however, understanding the behaviours of state HEIs has been a subject of research by many 
scholars of economics, education and public administration. Compared to other bureaucracies, 
HEIs usually enjoy much greater autonomy and their incomes are a mixture of both private and 
public financing.  
In the recent years, many public universities have also started to rely more on tuition 
income for their survival due to insufficient government funding (Chernoshtan and Griciva, 
2013; Jaramillo and Melonio, 2011). This shift in income structures of public HEIs from 
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government to tuition financing, to some extent, made those institutions more dependent on 
students who are paying for their education (Fowles, 2013). Whereas, universities which obtain 
large proportion of their operational revenues from contracting out research or private donations 
become heavily beholden to these clients or donors which are providing ‘critical’ financial 
resources (Bozeman and Gaughan, 2007). This form of resource dependency relationships 
between institutions and external stakeholders have been investigated by many researchers using 
different organisational theories, such as contingency, resource dependence, network 
organisation and institutional isomorphism theories. Most of the researchers found that RDT to 
be the most suitable theory in explaining the behavioural consequences of organisations within 
such relationships (Austin and Jones, 2015; Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003). Previous empirical 
works utilised this theory mainly for three purposes: to test this theory itself; to expose the 
behaviour of a focal institution based on its dependencies; or to explain patterns of exchange and 
dependency linkages. However, Nienhuser (2008) argues that “it is not possible to test such a 
complex theory like RDT in its entirety because it consists of many hypotheses” (p.18). 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows.  Section 2 critically reviews the 
relevant theoretical and empirical literature on resource dependence theory in the context of 
higher education. Section 3 is a description of the higher education system in Uzbekistan. The 
methodology and data, including descriptions of key variables and instrumental variables as well 
as summary statistics, is presented in Section 4. The estimates using OLS and TSLS regression 
are presented, discussed and interpreted in Section 5. Concluding comments follow in Section 6. 
The main conclusion is that the analysis of Uzbekistan data is consistent with the predictions of 
Resource Dependency Theory.          
 
2. Previous Research   
  Research Development Theory (RDT), was orignally formulated by Jeffrey Pfeffer and 
Gerald Salancik in 1978. This theory emphasizes that control over resource allocation is an 
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important power source in organisations and the core of this theory is that "the behaviours of 
organisations will respond to demand made by external organisations upon whose resources they 
are heavily dependent” (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; p. 39). These scholars propose three factors 
which are ‘critical’ in describing the dependence of one institution on a second institution: (1) 
“the importance of resource and the extent to which the institution requires it for continued 
operation and survival; (2) the extent of discretion over the allocation and use of a resource 
possessed by the other institution; (3) the extent to which there are few alternatives or 
concentration of resource control” (p. 45). Within this frame, the power of an organisation is 
interpreted as a measure of the extent to which it can govern responses and decrease its 
dependencies on external resources. 
Since many years, this theory has been a principal and influential theory for explaining 
environment and organisation interactions, in that RDT can well exposes the impact of the 
external environment on organisational behaviours (Austin and Jones, 2015). These researchers 
remark that the environmental relation is based on concept that organisations cannot always 
sufficiently-support their-self and need engage in interchanges with their external environment 
for being alive. RDT is becoming a very popular among many researchers to explain the 
behaviour of organisations and to examine organisations dependency on other organisations' 
resources. One of the first studies that analysis the resource dependence of one organisation on 
another was conducted by Proven, Beyer and Kruytbosch in 1980. The scholars investigated the 
relationship between non-profit organisations and their ‘umbrella’ organisations funding. In 
agreement with the assumptions of RDT, they concluded that “power over an individual 
organisation is larger the more resources it controls” (p. 18). Empirical findings by Saidel (1991) 
are also consistent with the assumption of RDT. Through conducting a survey of 80 non-profit 
and 73 public organisations, the researcher finds a relationship between the importance of 
governed resources and the impact of the organisation governing those resources.  
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Over the last three decades the most of the conceptual and empirical studies on the RDT, 
which examine the relationships between organisations and external environments, have been 
extensively conducted by many researchers (Boyd, 2006; Casciaro and Piskorski, 2005; Davis 
and Cobb, 2010; Freel, 2000; Frooman, 1999; Hillman, Shropshire and Cannella, 2007; Ozcan 
and Eisenhardt, 2009). Since the main objective of our paper is to review the relevant empirical 
contributions on the development of RDT in the context of higher education, the empirical 
studies which utilise this theory to examine resource dependence of HEIs will be discussed from 
now on.  
The resource dependency relationship between HEIs and the external resource providers 
are comprehensively discussed by a very few scholars. These studies emphasise that institutions 
of higher education function within a multi stakeholder environment and they respond to the 
demands of institutions, students, parents, governments and legislation. Due to the declines in 
government funding, majority of the public HEIs begun to generate the main fraction of their 
income from students by providing teaching services and from enterprises by providing research 
and consulting services. Therefore, students and other purchasers of academic services become 
clients who make a significant influence on revenue streams of HEIs. In the context of higher 
education, the first substantial and influential work on evaluating the RDT and its assumptions 
belongs to Tolbert (1985). The scholar applies RDT to explore the administrative structures of 
HEIs and study samples contained 167 public and 114 private American HEIs which were 
randomly selected. Pamela Tolbert measures institutional resource dependence using the share of 
four main sources of funding to the total revenues of HEIs. The scholar assumes that the 
“magnitude of dependence would predict the number of administrative offices and positions 
associated with the management of the funds” (p. 3). Findings show that dependence on private 
sources of funding is a robust predictor of administrative differentiation. 
The first empirical contribution on testing RDT in terms of a comparison of the changing 
behaviour of HEIs and senior academic managements when seeking external-incomes to survive 
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is presented by Slaughter and Leslie (1997). The authors employed the data of universities in 
Australia, Canada, the UK and the US. Furthermore, Pilbeam (2012) implements this theory to 
explain the role of pro-vice chancellors (PVCs) in the interactions between 16 UK universities 
and resource environment. A web link for the questionnaire and a covering letter showing the 
aims of the study was send to the 16 PVCs responsible for teaching and 16 PVCs responsible for 
research at the UK universities. The main findings show that PVCs responsible for research have 
had a cohesive relationship between each other, while those PVCs responsible for teaching have 
had no significant relationship. Empirical study of Chen (2001) is also contributed to the 
development of RDT through evaluating the performance of the University Fund system in 
Taiwan. The scholar found that the Taiwanese universities are paying more attention on 
professional management training, operation management, and perception adjustment, but less 
attention on administrative management. Regarding the operation management; operation 
concentrates less on managing existing resources but more on acquiring financial resources, and 
cares more about internal and external interactions. Based on his findings the scholar suggested 
that the Taiwanese universities should redesign their organisational managements and structures 
by taking into account the needs of stakeholders.  
One of the recent empirical studies which utilises RDT in the context of higher education 
belongs to Fowles (2013). The scholar examines the relationship between institutional 
dependence on net tuition funds as a main source of income and institutional expenditures for 
instruction and related activities at 419 four-year public HEIs in the US. Using 11-year panel of 
university-level data, the instrumental variables model is implemented by admitting the potential 
endogeneity of institutional revenue pattern. A main independent variable was the share of total 
operating revenues derived from net tuition and the dependent variable in this estimation was the 
share of total institutional expenditures for education and related expenses. Results of the 
estimations reveal that institutional expenditures are highly sensitive to changes in revenue 
patterns at the American HEIs. However, one of the main drawbacks of Fowles’s (2013) study is 
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that the obvious and critical question of – whether or not the increased institutional expenditures 
for education and related expenses increased graduation rates or educational outcomes – left 
unanswered. However another recently published study that is delivered by Coupet (2013), to 
some extent, fills the gap left by Fowles (2013). Jason Coupet examines the impact of total 
operational expenditures on graduation rates in Black and other universities using a 6-year panel 
of four-year American institutions. A Chow test is used in order to find structural differences in 
production functions of 152 Black and 3086 other institutions. The analysis finds noteworthy 
structural differences, e.g., at Black institutions - the administrative expenditures have a 
significantly negative influence on graduation rates. For this reason, Coupet (2013) suggests to 
reduce the administrative costs or to alleviate the negative impact of these costs on student 
outcomes through mitigating resource dependence. 
 
3. An Overview of the Uzbek Higher Education System     
 
The higher education system of Uzbekistan is mainly funded from the state budget at 
three levels: local, regional and central (ADB Evaluation Study, 2011). Institutions of higher 
education, teacher training institutions and affiliated academic lyceums in the Republic are 
financed mainly from the central budget. The budget expenditure is calculated based on the 
student quotas, the costs of government grants for students, fixed assets, equipment and 
buildings. To evaluate the salary of higher education staff a 9/1 students and a teacher ratio has 
been used since 1996, but in practice it differs depending on the field of study (EC Tempus, 
2010). According to the Decree of the Cabinet of Ministers of Uzbekistan (CMUZB) (1997), 
before starting of every academic year – all public HEIs make budget bids based on the basis of 
the last year's allocations to the institutions, which are submitted to and then evaluated by the 
ministries and agencies. These ministries and agencies aggregate the total budget and thereafter 
submit to the MFUZB, where a judgement about the total is made and return to those ministries 
and agencies which then redistribute the final figures between the HEIs (Mirkurbanov, 
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Anoshkina and Danilova, 2009). Furthermore, extra-budgetary funds make up more than half of 
overall expenditures on the higher education system of Uzbekistan in these days. Main reasons 
of this situation can be seen the continually raising the number of contract-paid students and the 
prices of their education (EC Tempus, 2010). The extra-budget funds of Uzbek HEIs are usually 
generated from the following sources: tuition and other fees, renting the properties and provision 
of short-term training programs by academic staff of institutions (MFUZB, 2013).  
According to the Resolution of the CMUZB (2001), extra-budget funds which obtained 
from tuition charges and other private activities do not reduce the amount of funding from the 
public budget. These extra revenues can be spent for operational expenditures of HEIs, but all 
financial activities have to be reported to their ministries. For example, the Tashkent Medicine 
Academy reports about the allocations of its extra-budget funds to the Ministry of Health. 
Particularly, the extra-budget funds can be spent for further developments of the facilities and 
infrastructure of universities (NHDR, 2011). According to Figure 1, the amount of extra/off-
budget funding has considerably increased relative to the state-budget funding at Uzbek HEIs 
during the period 2007-2013.  
If we rely on the data exposed by the figure above, the off-budget funding rose by over 
27 per cent in 2013 compared to 2000. In 2013, the off-budget funds were twice higher than the 
state-budget funds due to extensively increased tuition fees. It is important to remark that a share 
of institutional revenue derived from tuition payments has consisted more than 90 per cent of 
total off-budget revenue at public HEIs – since 2007, but shares of institutional revenue from 
research activities and public services were lower than 10 per cent during that period (MFUZB, 
2013). Moreover, Table 1 illustrates that the total expenditure per student has insignificantly 
changed between the period 2000 and 2013. A slight trend towards an increase in public 
expenditure per student is witnessed during the annual adjustment for inflation of teachers' wages 
and students' scholarships. A decline in the off-budgetary expenditure per student may be a result 
of the fact that in 2003, the adjustment for inflation of the tuition fee contracts amount was not 
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made (EC Tempus, 2010). In 2013, with respect to the state-budget funding per student and 
payment per student on a fee-based contract, the amount of the state expenditure reduced from 
50 to 25 per cent depending on the academic performance of a student. This residual amount per 
student does not meet even the minimal needs of the Uzbek HEIs.  
The data obtained from the MFUZB (2013) suggest that expenditures by the Uzbek 
government on higher education have increased by 10 per cent from 2007 to 2013. Accordingly, 
the amount of funds which need to be allocated to the several institutional expenditures, such as 
wages, stipends, social and other funds, capital costs and other expenses, have also increased 
year by year. Huge portions of the governmental funds were dedicated to paying stipends of 
students and salaries of academic staff over the period of 2007 to 2013. Whereas, relatively less 
amount of funds have been allocated to capital costs and other expenses. However, this increased 
expenditure to higher education was sufficient neither to expand the number of academic staff 
nor to improve financially sustainable operation of HEIs.  
Since the mid-2000s, there has been a reform that was aimed to introduce a high degree 
of autonomy to the HEIs. Since then, to all public HEIs have been allocated a total budget by 
MFUZB and those institutions have had autonomy to determine how this budget should be spent. 
Public HEIs are free to set their own tuition charges, but within a maximum cap which is 
determined by CMUZB. The administrators of HEIs can freely decide about the use of tuition 
revenues, but their ministries should be reported about the management of the private funds in 
addition to the public funds. Sources of finance at the Uzbek HEIs are now much more 
heterogeneous compared to the previous decade, with more than 60 per cent of total revenue 
coming from private sources in 2013 (MFUZB, 2013). Thus, this enhanced autonomy has 
encouraged institutions to pay heed to the financial performance and cost efficiency of their 
operations. Despite of the increased autonomy, the public HEIs in Uzbekistan remain very 
similar in their status and mission. 
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Figure 3 illustrates the evaluation of institutional revenue patterns for all public HEIs in 
Uzbekistan, figured against the considerably increasing tuition prices over the 14 years. The 
figure below also exposes that the reduced allocations from government after 2002 have been 
offset by an increased reliance on tuition revenue. This increased revenue has been derived 
mostly in part through raises in tuition charges, although most of the public HEIs considerably 
increased the number of contract-based student enrolments over the sample period. 
According to the figure above, Uzbek HEIs have considerably increased their share of tuition 
revenue in order to fill the gap left by the reduced government funding over the last two decades. 
As these public HEIs become more dependent on tuition payments as income sources, the RDT 
proposes that it is reasonable to expect these institutions to produce outputs which are more 
consistent with the demands of the students who are paying these tuition fees. By applying this 
notion to the current context, we construct following research hypothesis which is subject to 
empirical test: a resource dependence perspective suggests that increased institutional revenues 
generated mostly from tuition payments lead to an increased share of institutional expenditures 
dedicated to education and other student related activities at public HEIs in Uzbekistan.  
 
4. Methodology 
4.1 Empirical model 
Based on the theoretical discussions above, the following empirical model is estimated to 
investigate the relationship between institutional expenditure and revenue patterns: 
 
𝑆𝐻𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽𝑆𝐻𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡 +  𝛿𝑇𝑉𝐶𝑖𝑡 +  𝛾𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 +  𝜇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  (1) 
 
where, i and t are the institutions and time respectively.  
𝑆𝐻𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑡 – captures the share of total institutional expenditures dedicated to education expenses 
for i institutions and t years;  
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𝑆𝐻𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡 – captures the share of institutional revenues derived from tuition payments for i 
institutions and t years;  
𝑇𝑉𝐶𝑖𝑡 – is a vector of time-varying institutional-level controls;  
time – is a linear time trend which is included to capture the effect of common changes 
impacting all HEIs over time.   
𝜇𝑖 – denotes the institution-specific fixed effects; and 𝜀 – denotes the idiosyncratic error term.  
One of the main challenges in this empirical study is the potential endogeneity of the 
tuition share of total institutional revenues (𝑆𝐻𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡). Therefore, it is reasonable to suspect that 
𝑆𝐻𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡 may be simultaneously determined with the share of total institutional expenditures for 
educational expenses (𝑆𝐻𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑡). In other words, it is often the case that the universities would 
strategically define both their tuition revenue and expenditure patterns simultaneously. This 
endogeneity cannot be ignored in the empirical analysis of the Eq. (1). Otherwise, this equation 
would result in biased estimates of the statistical coefficients between the dependent variable and 
the independent variables. One of the potential methods to solve the problem of an endogenous 
independent variable is to use the instrumental variable (IV) approach. In order to use the IV(s) 
with the endogenous variable (𝑆𝐻𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡), at least one observable variable (𝑍𝑖𝑡) will be required 
which is not already captured by Eq. (1). Also, 𝑍𝑖𝑡 must satisfy two following conditions as 
stated by Wooldridge, 2002:  
First condition is that 𝑍𝑖𝑡 must not be correlated with the error term:  
 
Instrument exogeneity: 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑍𝑖𝑡, 𝜀𝑖𝑡) = 0 
 
In fact, it is not usually easy to test this condition because of unavailability of unbiased estimator 
for (𝜀𝑖𝑡).   Second condition requires the partial or strong relationship between (𝑍𝑖𝑡) and the 
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endogenous variable (𝑆𝐻𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡). In other words, 𝑍𝑖𝑡  must have no direct influence on 𝑆𝐻𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑡 but 
must have direct influence on 𝑆𝐻𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡:  
 
Instrument relevance: 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑍𝑖𝑡, 𝑆𝐻𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡) ≠ 0 
 
With the aim to satisfy these two conditions, particularly the latter one, as well as to account for 
this potential endogeneity of 𝑆𝐻𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡, two instrumental variables are used in this study. We 
expect these IVs are at least partially correlated with the endogenous variable (𝑆𝐻𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡) while 
uncorrelated with the dependent variable (𝑆𝐻𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑡) and the error term (𝜀𝑖𝑡).    
In this empirical strategy, the first IV (𝜃1𝑍𝑖𝑡) is the inflation-adjusted "Development 
Fund" for each of the academic years given in the analysis. According to the Decree introduced 
by the CMUZB in 1997, each HEI must devote their five per cent of overall income to this fund's 
budget at the beginning of every academic year (see, CMUZB, 1997). However, if any of the 
Uzbek institutions seek extra funding to finance its institutional expenses, then the CMUZB 
returns the HEI an amount of money which is negotiated between the CMUZB and the 
institution. It is important to note that all public HEIs, to some extent, rely on "Development 
Fund" returns to finance institutional activities. Therefore, it is plausible to suspect that 
exogenous changes in the returns generated by "Development Fund" should have a direct impact 
on relative institutional revenue patterns (𝑆𝐻𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡), but should not have a direct impact on 
(𝑆𝐻𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑡). 
The second IV (𝜃2𝑍𝑖𝑡) is the dummy variable, additional admission allowance, which 
captures the number of additional students enrolled as a tuition-fee basis at the public 
universities in each academic year. The Uzbek institutions may receive this allowance during the 
first month of academic semester (in September) if demands to study at these institutions from 
matriculants are too high. This is a responsibility of the CMUZB to decide either to allocate or 
not to allocate extra admission quotas to HEIs. As such, I set to one if the HEIs received this 
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allowance, zero otherwise. If a university receives this allowance, then this HEI generates extra 
revenue, since every additionally enrolled student has to pay a full instruction fee. According to 
the report of CMUZB, the funds from additional admission allowance have to be allocated for 
improving infrastructure of the HEIs, such as constructing new campuses as well as purchasing 
new technologies and furniture (NHDR, 2011).      
 
4.2 Key Variables 
The dependent variable in this analysis is the share of total institutional expenditures for 
educational activities which captures the amount of institutional spending on instruction, student 
services, as well as the spending on maintaining of the library and classroom facilities. Thus, 
𝑆𝐻𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑡 measure includes both current expenditures and capital expenditures in the form of 
depreciation. However, the main part of 𝑆𝐻𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑡 goes to the salaries paid to academic and 
administrative staff to maintain the provision of education as well as financial support to students 
for assisting them with monthly stipends. At Uzbek public HEIs, all students receive institutional 
stipends based on their previous semester’s grades (Index Mundi, 2013).   
In other words, this variable captures the share of institutional expenditures occurring in 
the regions most possibly to have tangible and direct benefit to students or those regions of 
spending most reconcilable with the demands of students. The share of educational expenditures 
is calculated by simply dividing the education and other student related expenses by the total 
institutional expenditure.  
The key explanatory variable in this equation strategy captures the extent to which a HEI 
depend on tuition as a source of revenue (𝑆𝐻𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡). This variable is calculated as the tuition share 
of total operating incomes, and the total operating incomes consist of tuition revenue; 
government allocations and grants; private gifts and contracts; and revenue generated from 
services and sales of educational products. 
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Several time-varying control variables are also included into the model in order to control 
for their potential impacts on the dependent variable in the interest. Since the control variables in 
addition to the (𝑆𝐻𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡) may also have effects on the (𝑆𝐻𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑡), they need to be held constant to 
test the pure effect of the main independent variable on the dependent variable.  
The first time-varying institutional-level control variable in the model is institutional size 
(SIZE) which is measured as total institutional full-time equivalent student enrolment. This 
variable is included into the model to account for potential economies of scale in the provision of 
instruction. For example, institutions which care only about quantity but not quality may have 
incentive to decrease their educational expenses by increasing number of FTE student 
enrolments while keeping number of academic staff constant. The second control variable is the 
price of tuition and mandatory fees (TP) which is included due to expectations of very different 
expenditure patterns depending on tuition charges. For example, if tuition price functions as a 
market signal of institutional quality, then institutions with higher tuition prices may provide a 
better quality education and experience to their students which may yield greater educational 
expenditures. Moreover, in order to account for potential nonlinearities in the relationships 
between TP and SIZE and expenditures that the quadrates of these variables are included to the 
model. 
Undergraduate programs are relatively cheaper than postgraduate education at the all 
institution of higher education in Uzbekistan (Index Mundi, 2013). Therefore, the next controlled 
variable is the duration of postgraduate programs (measured as study weeks) which is include to 
control for the fact that all else equal. However, some scholars frequently argue that this greater 
cost in the provision of postgraduate education can be partially offset by economies of scope in 
postgraduate and undergraduate education (Albrecht and Ziderman, 1995; Koshal and Koshal, 
1999; and Barr, 2009). The number of staff is also included to the model as an independent 
variable which comprises the total number of academic and administrative staff at public HEIs. 
The reason of including this variable can be explained that a huge share of institutional 
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expenditure allocates to staff salaries at the all HEI in Uzbekistan (MFUZB, 2013). Therefore, if 
these institutions decide to increase the number of staff in order to reduce a ratio of student and 
staff with the aim to increase quality of education, then those institutions with greater number of 
personnel are more likely to have greater educational expenditures. Although institutions with 
smaller number of, but with better qualified and experienced, academic staff may still have an 
objective to deliver high quality educational services yielding higher instructional expenditures. 
Lastly, a simple linear time trend is also included to the model in order to capture the impact of 
common changes affecting all HEIs over time. 
4.3 Data Set 
This study utilises various institutional-level data which were collected mainly from one 
single source through working closely with several administrative personnel of the MFUZB. The 
financial data used for this study are mainly derived from Annual Financial Report of the each 
public HEI in Uzbekistan which is originally conducted by the Main Department for Financing 
Social Sphere and Science under the MFUZB. Using these Annual Financial Reports of public 
HEIs, the author constructed a panel dataset which is used in this study. This dataset contains 
variables on institutional main revenue sources such as tuition revenues, government allocations, 
income from private activities and incomes from "Development Fund”, as well as on various 
forms of institutional expenditures including expenditures to education for the universe of the 
public HEIs in Uzbekistan covering the years from 2000 to 2013.  
The dataset also contains several variables on institutional characteristics, such as number 
of FTE student enrolments, admissions, graduation rate, staffing and tuition prices for each 
institutions of higher education for the period of 2000 to 2013. These forms of data are retrieved 
from authorized documents which are prepared by the Main Department for Financing Social 
Sphere and Science under the MFUZB. Finally, the data for the duration of postgraduate 
programs are collected from the official web-site of the MHSSE for the years between 2000 and 
2013. This variable is measured as the share of study weeks offered at the postgraduate level. All 
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financial data are used as real UZB Soms during the analysis and estimation processes. For this 
purpose, the entire financial data were transformed from nominal Uzbek Soms to real Uzbek 
Soms using the Consumer Price Index (CPI) of Uzbekistan for the each of academic years. The 
CPI is a measure of the inflation rate of a basket of goods and services purchased by households, 
and the data are available from IMF World Economic Outlook Database. Although the outcomes 
considerably unchanged by adjusting by the GDP-deflator of Uzbekistan. 
The analytic sample utilised in this empirical study captures almost entire public HEIs in 
Uzbekistan from the years 2000 to 2013 for which complete data were available. The final 
sample comprises 857 institution-year observations demonstrating 62 public institutions of 
higher education, each of which is observed for an average of 13.8 years. Descriptive statistics 
for the share of total institutional expenditures dedicated to education expenses, the share of 
institutional revenue derived from tuition, institutional FTE enrolment and the tuition prices are 
provided for the HEIs included in the sample over the period 2000-2013 appear in Table 2. This 
table also captures the annual CPI scalar that was used to transform nominal Uzbek Soms to real 
Uzbek Soms. 
The table above illustrates that the per cent of institutional tuition revenue has been 
increased consistently over the sample period, while the per cent of total institutional 
expenditures dedicated to education expenses has been considerably increased too. This signifies 
that the growth in the share of tuition revenue yield to the increased share of educational 
expenditures at public HEIs in Uzbekistan. Table 2 also represents that on average, the number 
of full time enrolled students and the amount of tuition prices have remarkably increased by 
year. The peak of FTE enrolment took place in 2009, while the public HEIs charged the highest 
tuition fees in the last year of the sample. Furthermore, Table 3 represents the mean, the standard 
deviation, the minimum and the maximum data values of the share of total institutional 
expenditures dedicated to educational expenses, the share of institutional revenues derived from 
tuition, FTE student enrolment, tuition price (in 2013 UZB Soms), duration of postgraduate 
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programs, number of academic and administrative staff, as well as two instrumental variables 
"Development Fund" (in 2013 UZB Soms) and dummy additional admission allowances. 
 
5. Results 
5.1 OLS and TSLS Estimates 
This sub-section is dedicated to the interpretation of OLS estimation results. The standard 
regression findings are reported in Table 4 with four different specifications. The outcome of this 
table shows mixed results for the beta coefficients of the regressions. Some variables have 
positive coefficients while others have negative coefficients. The four specifications differentiate 
in the following way. Specification 1 shows only findings of simple OLS estimation (neither 
institutional effect is controlled nor time trend is included). Specification 2 captures the time 
trend in order to account for unexpected events or variation which may have influence on the 
dependent variable, while this specification does not include institutional fixed effect. 
Specification 3 includes institutional fixed effect only that captures the influence of time-
invariant characteristics of HEIs such as location, status and mission. The impact of these 
individual characteristics, however, cannot be uniquely identified. The main insight here is that 
any changes in the educational expenditures must be due to effects other than those institutional 
fixed effects (Stock and Watson, 2007). Therefore, the coefficients revealed are not artefact of 
the confounding influence of those time-invariant variables in the last two specifications. Finally, 
Specification 4 includes the both institutional fixed effect and time trend. Moreover, all the 
specification results include cluster-robust standard errors in order to account for arbitrary forms 
of intra-group correlation and heteroscedasticity.  
The table above reveals that many of the explanatory variables can have significant, 
either positive or negative, influence on the dependent variable in the interest. Since both the 
dependent and main independent variables are measured as percentages, the coefficient on the 
tuition share factor can be understood as an elasticity of a Cobb-Douglas function that measures 
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the responsiveness of institutional expenditures to changes in institutional revenues. The first 
specification of Table 4 shows that a one percentage point increase in the main explanatory 
variable that is the tuition share yields a 0.08 percentage point increase in the share of 
institutional expenditures allocated to educational expenses, holding all other regressors 
constant. However, the percentage of (𝑆𝐻𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑡) is increased and the coefficient becomes 
statistically significant when the time trend is included to the model in Specification 2. 
Additionally, the accounting for institutional fixed effects led to decreased and insignificant 
coefficient of the main independent variable (𝑆𝐻𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡) in Specification 3. In the fourth 
specification, (𝑆𝐻𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡)’s coefficient of 0.12 suggests that HEIs are quite inelastic. In other 
words, large changes in tuition revenue leads proportionally smaller changes in institutional 
expenditures dedicated to education expenses. 
If one makes a decision by relying on the OLS estimation outcomes, then the endogeneity 
of 𝑆𝐻𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡 would be ignored in the Eq. (1). This would result in biased estimates of the 
relationship between the explanatory variables and the dependent variable in the interest. In this 
study, the two instrumental variables are utilised to solve this potential endogeneity of the main 
independent variable by applying the TSLS estimator that is originally developed by Theil 
(1953). According to Wooldridge (2002), the TSLS technique is one of the efficient ways to 
combine multiple instruments. Table 5 exposes the TSLS results with four different 
specifications. Specification 1 reveals that TSLS outcomes which were estimated without 
accounting for institutional fixed effects and linear time trend. Specification 2 includes time 
trend only, but Specification 3 drops linear time trend while includes institutional fixed effects. 
Both of the institutional fixed effects and time trend are captured in Specification 4 in order to 
expose the net effect of the predictors on (𝑆𝐻𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑡). All of the TSLS estimations utilise the robust 
standard errors clustered on institutions. 
Findings of the first and second specifications reveal that all of the variables have 
statistically significant coefficients when the institutional fixed effect is not included into the 
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models. The TSLS estimations show that the magnitudes of several exogenous variables (TP and 
TPSQ) become statistically insignificant when institutional fixed effects are accounted for in the 
last two specifications. Moreover, the variable of tuition revenue share shows negative but highly 
significant coefficients in the first two specifications. However, Table 5 shows that the values of 
𝑆𝐻𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡 become a positive and remarkably high when potential effects of institutional time-
invariant characteristics are accounted for. The coefficients of this main explanatory variable are 
statistically significant at 1% level in the all specification phases. The last specification of TSLS 
results reveal that, on average, a one percentage point increase in the share of institutional 
revenue generated from tuition yields a 0.83 percentage point growth in the share of institutional 
expenditures dedicated to education expenses, holding all other variables constant. In general, 
these findings are more consistent with findings of Fowles (2013) and Titus (2006a, b) regarding 
the relationships between institutional revenue patterns and student outcomes. These scholars 
conclude that if the American HEIs change their revenue structures from government funding to 
student tuition dollars, then these institutions are more like to shift their expenditure patterns to 
more greatly emphasized activities which most consistent with the preferences of this particular 
customer cohort. 
When the both institutional fixed effects and linear time trend are captured, the fourth 
specification of the OLS results exposes that estimated coefficient of (𝑆𝐻𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡) is over seven 
times smaller than one that estimated utilising TSLS model which is not simply a point of 
econometric significance. The estimated coefficients can be interpreted as an elasticity that 
measures the responsiveness of the institutional expenditures to changes in institutional revenue. 
The OLS coefficient of 0.12 percentage suggests that Uzbek HEIs are fairly inelastic, which 
means the large changes in the share of tuition revenue cause proportionally smaller changes in 
the share of expenditures allocated to education expenses. Conversely, the TSLS results reveal a 
much stronger institutional response to changing revenue structure by confirming that Uzbek 
institutions are quite elastic in this respect. 
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Regarding institutional characteristics, when both the institutional time-invariant 
variables and linear time trend are included, some remarkable differences emerge in institutional 
expenditures. A straightforward effect is observed for FTE student enrolments; institutional size 
is negatively correlated to the share of institutional expenditures dedicated to education activities 
across all institutions. Thus, all else equal, the educational expenditures (𝑆𝐻𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑡) decrease by -
0.003 percentage if institutional FTE enrolments increase by a one student. This finding can be 
explained by the economies of scale in the provision of education at the public HEIs in 
Uzbekistan. Perhaps, the Uzbek universities were trying to decrease the total institutional costs 
by increasing students/teacher ratio over the sample period. The coefficient on the duration of 
postgraduate program shows that institutions with longer postgraduate course provision spend 
more on educational activities. This outcome is not surprising given the increased institutional 
expenditure associated with postgraduate instructions. This finding is in line with the recent 
study of Fowles (2013), who found that the American public HEIs with a greater graduate share 
of total instructional hours spend more on education and related expenses. Specifications 4 also 
exposes, all else equal, the dependent variable increases by 0.01 percentage point as number of 
personnel increases by a one employee at 1% significance level. This finding suggests that 
institutions with greater number of academic and administrative staff spend more on educational 
expenses.  
One possible explanation for this finding can be wages of staff; a huge share of 
institutional expenditures goes for paying staff salary at the all public HEIs. Therefore, it is 
reasonable to expect that increased number of academic or administrative personnel is more 
likely to lead the increased share of institutional expenditures dedicated to educational activities. 
For example, institutions that care more about a quality of education may decide to decrease a 
student/staff ratio by increasing a quantity of academic staff or by hiring "better" qualified and 
experienced senior academics those normally demand relatively higher salaries than less 
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experienced and lower qualified teachers. Both of these methods may yield to the increased 
institutional costs. 
The coefficient of linear time trend reveals positive and insignificant magnitude in the 
second specification, but it shows statistically significant coefficient in the last specification. 
While plausible explanation for this outcome can be driven by the recent increased attention that 
improving quality of curricula and opening new faculties which specialised to information 
technologies have received from the CMUZB. Perhaps, public universities are responding to that 
pressure through dedicating the increased institutional expenditures to activities intended to 
promote these objectives. 
 
5.2 Diagnostic Tests 
Once the instrumental variable techniques are utilised, as suggested by Wooldridge 
(2002), it is a very important to conduct tests for exogeneity and for the validity of the over-
identifying restrictions. Therefore, findings of the conducted tests for exogeneity and validity of 
the external instruments will be discussed in this part of the paper. 
 
5.2.1 Testing for Exogeneity  
One of the main reasons for implementing the TSLS estimator was the suspension that the key 
independent variable (𝑆𝐻𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡) is endogenous. If this endogeneity is in fact not a problem, the 
TSLS estimator will be consistent (provided that the instruments are relevant and valid) but 
inefficient due to higher variance than for OLS estimator. In other words, if (SHTRit) is in fact 
exogenous, then OLS and 2SLS estimators should differentiate only with sampling error but they 
should not reveal considerably different outcomes (Wooldridge, 2002). Accordingly, it is 
beneficial and a very important to examine the null hypothesis that SHTRit is exogenous (that 
𝐸[SHTRitεit] = 0; 𝑝 = 0) by testing for a statistically significant difference between the OLS 
and TSLS estimators of β. For this purpose, the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test is used in this 
diagnostic test and findings are presented in Table 6 (Hausman, 1978). The finding of the 
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endogeneity test reveals that the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test strongly rejects the null of exogeneity 
of the suspected endogenous variable, suggesting the treatment of the main exogenous variable 
as endogenously determined.  
 
5.2.2 TSLS First-stage Estimates 
TSLS estimates are reported in Table 6 presents results of under-identification and weak-
identification tests. The Angrist and Pischke chi-square test of under-identification suggests 
rejecting the null hypothesis that the endogenous variable is unidentified. The Kleibergen-Paap 
rk LM statistic is also applied in order to conduct the test of under-identification that also 
suggests rejecting the null. Critical values for the Angrist-Pischke F-statistics are not available. 
Therefore, the Stock et al. (2002) critical values should be applied, or the Staiger and Stock 
(1997) rule-of-thumb that the F-statistic should be equal or greater than 10 can be used here. The 
Angrist-Pischke F-statistic is higher than the basic threshold (11.6 > 10) which suggests rejecting 
the null hypothesis that the utilised instruments are weak. Since the cluster-robust standard errors 
are used, the Klibergen-Paap Wald rk F-statistic is also appropriate test for weak-identification 
analysis. Using critical value of Stock et al. (2002), F-statistic of 15.9 indicates that IV estimates 
retain 10% of OLS bias, suggesting to reject the null hypothesis of weak-identification.  
 
5.2.3. Validity of Instruments 
The decision to instrument the share of institutional revenue derived from tuition with the 
"Development Fund" and dummy "additional admission allowance" variables require careful 
consideration to instruments validity. As such, it is important to test for validity of over-
identifying restrictions when the number of instruments exceed from the number of endogenous 
variable. As it was remarked earlier that this study utilises the two IVs and only one the 
endogenous variable. In this diagnostic part, the Hansen J-statistic is employed since the cluster-
robust standard errors are applied in the TSLS estimation procedures. The over-identification test 
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suggests that IVs are not correlated with the error term of the second stage across all models. 
Therefore, I test the null hypothesis that the instrument sets are valid and the model is correctly 
specified (Hayashi, 2000). A rejection arise doubt on the validity of the instruments. However, 
Table 6 exposes that Hansen J-statistic fails to reject the null hypothesis. This means, the IVs 
those were employed during the TSLS estimations are valid and simultaneously uncorrelated 
with the error term of Eq. (1), thus the instruments are correctly excluded from the estimated 
equation.  
 
6. Concluding Comments 
The results of TSLS estimations suggest that the Uzbek universities have significantly 
changed their behaviours through paying more attention to finance educational and other student 
related activities when these institutions' income structure shifted from full public funding to 
mostly tuition funding. These findings are in the line with the RDT, thus we do not reject the 
research hypothesis: a resource dependence perspective suggests that increased institutional 
revenues generated mostly from tuition payments lead to an increased share of institutional 
expenditures dedicated to education and other student related activities at public HEIs in 
Uzbekistan. This empirical finding is in the line with findings of Fowles (2013), Slaughter and 
Leslie (1997) and Tolbert (1985). These scholars find that the American public HEIs relied more 
on incomes from tuition and other user fees for financing their educational and other related 
expenses due to the reduced state appropriations. 
The findings of this paper are expected to offer considerable policy suggestions to 
administrative bodies of public HEIs and the governmental institutions in Uzbekistan. Since the 
early 2000s, CMUZB has demanded from all public HEIs to derive a main fraction of their 
income by charging tuition and other user fees. Therefore, tuition revenue has been seen as the 
main replacement source to the reducing public subsidies at the Uzbek HEIs. However, "the 
strings attached to new funding steers faculty and administrators in new directions that are 
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potentially at odds with institutional missions, at least as these core missions have been defined 
historically" (Fowles, 2013; p. 283). That is, if CMUZB has implicit bargain with the HEIs 
which aims to direct government allocations to the provision of free education to the state grant-
based students or which requires the government allocations to be spent mainly for public 
services and research endeavours that may bring considerable benefits to the public, then the 
increased dependence on tuition revenue will likely be accompanied by a reduction in the 
production of these activities. 
Throughout the last decade, the Uzbek government and public HEIs have accepted this 
trade-off through directing a huge share of institutional expenditures for educational activities. A 
very insignificant share of institutional funds is allocated to carrying out research activities at 
public institutions, and this issue is repeatedly and admittedly emphasised in the annual reports 
of MHSSE. In addition, to the best of my knowledge, none of the Uzbek HEI has dedicated any 
fraction of its financial resources for improving and supporting public services yet. Fowles 
(2013) proposed a plausible suggestion in the case that if this trade-off is permissible to 
policymakers, "if so, it seems that prudent public policy would suggest making this bargain 
explicitly and accompanying it with a fundamental renegotiation of the relationship between 
public institutions and the state in which they reside, rather than introducing these changes as an 
accidental consequence of evolving state expenditure patterns" (p. 284). 
The Uzbek government bodies should consider introducing policy decisions which could 
give more financial flexibility to public HEIs in managing their fiscal resources. Once the 
policies are in place, CMUZB should demand from the all institutions to increase their financial 
supports to not student related expenses only but to the other institutional activities as well (e.g., 
to improve scientific research). Although allocations of the greatest share of tuition income to the 
education related activities at Uzbek HEIs seem totally fair from the RDT perspective. However, 
the policy decisions must be powerful enough to 'force' administrative bodies of public 
universities to allocate a significant fraction of their institutional income for improving quality of 
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research activities and public services. Moreover, the Uzbek HEIs need to improve their 
cooperation with foreign organisations those are operating in Uzbekistan, such as EBRD, The 
World Bank, Asian Development Bank, UNESCO and many others, in order to obtain more 
research funding and grants. Another way of generating considerable research incomes could be 
by creating entrepreneurial centres at the Uzbek HEIs for developing businesses and innovative 
projects initiated by academic staff. This type of entrepreneurial centres are already implemented 
at the most of public HEIs in the US and the UK, and projects which are conducted in these 
centres bring a considerable amount of private funds for these universities. 
The empirical finding conducted in this paper, however, is not able to answer the critical 
and obvious question of whether or not this increased educational expenditure at public HEIs is 
actually associated with increased quality of institutional outputs (i.e. students) and increased 
institutional efficiency. A few but growing empirical evidences reveal that the increased 
educational expenditures do not always lead to successful long-term student outcomes (Coupet, 
2013; Pike et al., 2006). Furthermore, the RDT integrated with other organisational theoretical 
models might provide strong theoretical frame for future research. For facilitating the 
development of a better understanding of the role of environment in understanding institutional 
behaviours, researchers should seek to apply and examine the different theoretical frameworks 
developed in the organisational behaviour and related literatures. A next step to this research 
could be to study the roles of institutional isomorphism, network organisation and population 
ecology theories in explaining how Uzbek HEIs shape and are shaped by the environment in 
which they operate. According to Fowles (2013) studies that “only through such endeavours can 
scholars begin to develop a more comprehensive conceptual model which integrates the complex 
interrelationships between stakeholders, resources, institutions, and ultimately, organisational 
outcomes” (p. 285). 
Since the RDT is organisational based, it is generalizable to other educational situations. 
As in many other countries, all the departments and faculties compete for scarce funding within 
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the public HEIs in Uzbekistan. Therefore, we advise to conduct further empirical studies through 
broadening this research into other contexts within institutional departments or faculties using 
more enriched and extended departmental- or faculty-level data. 
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Figure 1: The State-budget and Off-budget Funding of HEIs in 2000-2013 
 
 
Source: MFUZB (2013) 
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Figure 2: Expenditures on Higher Education in Percentage (between 2007 and 2013) 
 
Source: MFUZB (2013) 
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Figure 3: Revenue patterns at the public HEIs in Uzbekistan from 2000 to 2013 
Source: MFUZB (2013), author’s calculations 
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Table 1: Trends in Expenditure Per Student 
 
 
Indicators 
Monetary 
unit 2000/2001 2003/2004 2007/2008 2011/2012 2012/2013 
Total expenditure per student 
UZS('000) 125.8 126.3 109.1 109.1 112.3 
US dollars 531.7 533.8 461.1 461.1 474.6 
State-budget expenditure per 
student on scholarship 
UZS('000) 153.5 171.4 172.1 184.8 197.8 
US dollars 661.5 724.4 727.4 781.1 836 
Extra-budget expenditure per 
student on a fee-based contract 
UZS('000) 92.3 96.7 73.7 70.7 72.3 
US dollars 390.1 408.7 311.5 298.8 305.6 
 
Source: MFUZB (2013) 
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Table 2: Selected Institutional Characteristics 
Year Per cent of total 
institutional 
expenditures 
dedicated to 
education (%) 
Per cent of 
institutional 
revenue derived 
from tuition (%) 
Full-time 
equivalent 
enrolment 
Tuition price 
(in constant 
2013 UZS) 
Consumer 
Price Index 
scalar 
2000 72.79 39.70 1,559 487,763 0.1860 
2001 73.70 44.38 1,864 666,843 0.2366 
2002 72.77 48.35 2,037 978,795 0.3012 
2003 71.80 51.33 2,167 1,188,452 0.3361 
2004 79.08 54.09 2,497 1,209,043 0.3582 
2005 80.57 53.54 2,741 1,221,981 0.3942 
2006 79.25 55.39 3,387 1,223,445 0.4503 
2007 82.92 55.39 3,799 1,338,272 0.5056 
2008 82.79 58.14 4,256 2,071,708 0.5700 
2009 85.57 58.46 4,648 2,859,238 0.6503 
2010 85.93 61.36 3,935 3,765,462 0.7113 
2011 75.63 60.13 3,671 4,299,449 0.8025 
2012 83.07 60.66 3,763 4,753,797 0.8992 
2013 86.61 61.71 3,683 5,010,595 1.0000 
 
Source: MFUZB (2013), CB of Uzbekistan and IMF World Economic (2015), authors’ calculations 
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Table 3: Summary Statistics: Regression Variables 
 
 
Variable  Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
SHEE 857 0.80 0.094 0.16 0.98 
SHTR 857 0.541 0.161 0.06 0.95 
SIZE 857 3231 2424 60 12648 
TP (000) 857 2265 1589 393 6050 
DurPP 857 63 26 0 102 
NumStaff 857 783 507 34 2950 
DevFund (million) 857 1995 2420 0 13209 
DumAdAdm 857 0.891 0.311 0 1 
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Table 4: OLS Estimates 
 
Variables Spec.1 Spec.2 Spec.3 Spec.4 
     
SHTR 0.083 
(0.064) 
0.098* 
(0.066) 
0.095 
(0.077) 
0.115* 
(0.084) 
TP 2.96e-08* 
(1.54e-08) 
5.03e-08*** 
(1.56e-08) 
3.61e-08* 
(1.96e-08) 
5.19e-08*** 
(1.66e-08) 
TPSQ -1.86e-15 
(2.06e-15) 
-3.64e-15* 
(1.91e-15) 
-2.77e-15 
(2.57e-15) 
-3.90e-15* 
(2.23e-15) 
SIZE -1.67e-05*** 
(6.45e-06) 
-1.48e-05** 
(6.67e-06) 
-2.48e-05*** 
(7.06e-06) 
-2.17e-05*** 
(7.70e-06) 
SIZESQ 1.26e-09*** 
(3.89e-10) 
1.14e-09*** 
(4.04e-10) 
1.70e-09*** 
(4.17e-10) 
1.44e-09*** 
(4.72e-10) 
DURPP 0.0002 
(0.0002) 
0.0002 
(0.0002) 
0.0002 
(0.0002) 
0.0002 
(0.0002) 
NUMSTAFF 2.34e-05 
(2.39e-05) 
2.81e-05 
(2.44e-05) 
2.70e-05 
(3.12e-05) 
4.11e-05 
(3.38e-05) 
YEAR -- -0.005* 
(0.002) 
-- -0.005 
(0.003) 
Institutional fixed effects? NO NO YES YES 
Observations 857 857 857 857 
Number of HEIs 62 62 62 62 
 
Notes: Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses 
           * Significant at 10% level, ** Significant at 5% level and *** Significant at 1% level 
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Table 5: OLS Estimates 
 
Variables Spec.1 Spec.2 Spec.3 Spec.4 
     
SHTR -0.740*** -0.779*** 0.525** 0.829*** 
 (0.265) (0.263) (0.249) (0.342) 
TP 1.12e-07*** 1.04e-07*** -2.68e-08 5.70e-09 
 (3.56e-08) (2.96e-08) (3.87e-08) (2.56e-08) 
TPSQ -1.05e-14** -9.76e-15*** 4.29e-15 3.32e-15 
 (4.34e-15) (3.72e-15) (4.58e-15) (3.97e-15) 
SIZE 0.00005*** 0.00005*** -0.00004*** -0.00003*** 
 (0.00002) (0.00002) (8.31e-06) (7.41e-06) 
SIZESQ -2.32e-09** -2.44e-09** 2.61e-09*** 2.01e-09*** 
 (1.06e-09) (1.05e-09) (6.03e-10) (5.07e-10) 
DURPP 0.0012*** 0.0013*** -0.00002 0.0001* 
 (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
NUMSTAFF -0.00006*** -0.00006*** 0.00003* 0.0001*** 
 (0.00002) (0.00002) (0.00002) (0.00003) 
YEAR -- 0.003 -- 0.020** 
  (0.005)  (0.008) 
Institutional fixed effects? NO NO YES YES 
Observations 857 857 857 857 
Number of HEIs 62 62 62 62 
 
Notes: Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses 
           * Significant at 10% level, ** Significant at 5% level and *** Significant at 1% level 
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Table 6: Diagnostic Tests 
 
 
(1)Endogeneity 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman Chi2  statistic 8.35 P=0.004 Reject Ho 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman F-statistic 7.73 P=0.006 Reject Ho 
 
(2) Under-identification 
Angrist-Pischke first stage chi-
squaresd statistic 
13.25 p=0.000 Reject Ho 
Kleibergen-Paaprk LM chi-squaresd 
statistic                          
11.71 p=0.003 Reject Ho 
 
(3)Weak-identification 
Angrist-Pischke first stage F-
statistic                                    
11.61 p=0.000 Reject Ho 
Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F-statistic                                        15.88 P=0.000 Reject Ho 
 
(4) Over-identification 
 
Hansen J-statistic 1.39 P=0.24 Do not reject Ho 
 
Note: Institutional fixed effects and linear time trend are included and cluster-robust standard 
errors are reported. Test statistics: Number of clusters-62; Observations-857; Endogenous 
regressor-1; Excluded instruments-2. 
 
